Public preferences and inflation by Carl E. Walsh
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
Number 91-29, August 30,1991
Public Preferences
I. 1'1 .. • ana InTlatlon
Inflation rates vary enormously from country
to country. Between 1977 and 1989, for instance,
inflation averaged 6.2 percent in the U.s., 2.8
percent in Japan, and 40 percent in Iceland.
Even within the European Common Market
inflation rates in this period ranged from 3.0
percent in Germany to 19.1 percent in Greece.
What accounts for these differences? Is it because
countries with high inflation experienced stronger
inflationary shocks, from either external or inter-
nal sources, than low inflation countries? Is it
because differing institutional structures in each
country lead nations to respond differently to
common worldwide economic events?
Recent theories imply that differences in inflation
may simply reflect public attitudes in a country,
in particular, a willingness to tolerate inflation
in return for short-run economic expansion and
reduced unemployment. According to these
theories, an economy's average rate of inflation
reflects the weight society places on inflation
relative to unemployment. Countries that weigh
the costs of inflation heavily should have lower
average rates of inflation. Conversely, countries
that place low weight on maintaining low infla-
tion should have higher average inflation. These
theories are based on the notion that central
banks have an incentive to engage in expan-
sionary policies in order to achieve a temporary
reduction in unemployment at the cost of higher
inflation. If society places little weight on the
costs of the higher inflation, the incentive will
be great to attempt to reduce unemployment.
As a result, inflation will tend to be higher.
Recent work comparing household surveys of
attitudes in the u.s. and New Zealand provides
some interesting evidence on the role of social
attitudes in affecting a nation's inflation experi-
ence. Since 1977, inflation has averaged 6.2
percent in the u.s. and 12.1 percent in New
Zealand. The surveys are consistent with the
hypothesis that New Zealanders are less averse
to inflation than Americans; New Zealand's
higher rate of inflation may reflect the political
process which supplies the rate of inflation the
public demands.
Measuring attitudes towardsinflation
Survey data allow the construction of a measure
of average attitudes towards inflation. However,
it is important to keep in mind that attitudes
towards inflation are usually complex and vary
with each individual's own personal economic
situation. One of the major real costs of inflation,
particularly when the inflation was not fully an-
ticipated or indexation is incomplete, is an arbi-
trary redistribution of wealth. An unexpected rise
in the rate of inflation tends to distribute wealth
away from creditors and towards debtors; an un-
expected decline in inflation has the opposite
effect. It should not be surprising, therefore, that
attitudes towards inflation vary widely across the
population. Broad measures of average views on
inflation can hide this diversity of opinion but
may still be useful in assessing the general atti-
tude ofthe population.
In order to construct a measure of society's
preference for inflation, it is necessary to focus
explicitly on the costs and benefits of inflation. In
the abstract, most people would probably prefer
zero inflation. Such an observation is relatively
unhelpful though, since it fails to provide any
information on the price society would be willing
to pay to achieve zero inflation. Since the major
cost of reducing inflation is usually considered to
be the resulting temporary rise in unemployment,
the appropriate way to measure society's prefer-
ence for inflation is to focus on the trade-off the
public is willing to make between inflation and
unemployment.
Smyth and Woodfield (1991) examine this trade-
off by constructing an index based on the survey
responses to the question: "What is the single
most important problem facing New Zealand
now?" The index is equal to the number citing
inflation expressed as a fraction of the number
citing either inflation or unemployment as theFRBSF
most important problem. By relating this index
to actual inflation and unemployment, Smyth
and Woodfield can calculate the preferences
of a hypothetical "median voter," represented
by the point where the number of people who
would cite inflation as the most important prob-
lem is the same as the number who would cite
unemployment. They then compare the results
with similar evidence from u.s. surveys.
The results of the comparison are quite interest-
ing and consistently reveal that New Zealanders
have a greater tolerance for inflation. The contrast
in attitudes with Americans can be illustrated by
considering the following question: How much
inflation will the median voter accept? The an-
swer will depend on the level of unemployment,
but at an unemployment rate of 6 percent, often
taken as a rough estimate of the sustainable aver-
age rate of unemployment in the U.s., the critical
rate of inflation is 4.2 percent. As inflation rates
rise above this figure, more survey respondents
cite inflation than unemployment as the most
serious problem. The corresponding critical
inflation rate at 6 percent unemployment for
New Zealand is estimated by Smyth and Wood-
field to be in the range of 30-34 percent, eight
times the value for the U.S.
This comparison may be misleading since New
Zealand has traditionally had much lower rates of
unemployment than the U.S. Thus, 6 percent un-
employment may be "normal" in the U.S., but it
represents unprecedented unemployment relative
to New Zealand's historical experience. Perhaps
it is not surprising then that inflation would need
to be at very high levels indeed to be considered
as serious as 6 percent unemployment in New
Zealand.
Currently, New Zealand is suffering from high
rates of unemployment, and recent major struc-
tural changes in its economy make it difficult to
estimate what might be the normal rate of un-
employment. If, however, one assumes a normal
unemployment rate of 3 percent, the contrast in
attitudes towards inflation is still quite remark-
able. At an unemployment rate of 3 percent, the
critical rate of inflation exceeds 13 percent. Ac-
cording to this study, New Zealanders are clearly
more tolerant of inflation than Americans are.
Political popularity
A second way to measure the public's prefer-
ences towards inflation is to examine how infla-
tion and unemployment affect the popularity of
elected politicians. In the U.s., the proposition
that Presidential popularity depends onthe state
of the economy is well established and forms the
basis of political rnodels ofthe business cycle.
These models attribute business cycles to the
manipulation of the economy by administrations
striving to be reelected. Political business cycle
models, and the evidence that they can explain
economic fluctuations, are critically reviewed
in Huh (1990).
Smyth and Woodfield (1991 b) examine results
from a New Zealand survey in which respon-
dents were asked whether they approved or dis-
approved of the overall performance of the
government. They then estimate the impact of
inflation and unemployment on the government's
approval rating using data from the end of 1985
to the beginning of 1990, a period characterized
by government attempts to reduce inflation. The
results indicate that increases in either inflation
or unemployment significantly reduce the ap-
proval rating the public gives the government.
Smyth and Woodfield estimate that at an initial
unemployment rate of 3 percent and an inflation
rate of 12 percent, a rise in unemployment to 4
percent would require a drop in inflation to less
than 7 percent to prevent the New Zealand gov-
ernment's approval rating from falling. The impli-
cit trade-off between inflation and unemployment
rates that would hold government approval con-
stant places much more weight on unemployment
than appears to be the case in the U.S. This is
consistent with the survey evidence on public
identification of the most serious economic
problem.
Do other countries follow the same pattern?
According to the Smyth and Woodfield studies,
New Zealanders seem more willing to trade off
inflation for unemployment reductions than
Americans, and New Zealand has generally
experienced much higher inflation than has the
U.S. Is the experience of other countries also
consistent with this pattern?
Nordhaus (1989) reports estimates ofthe impact
of unemployment and inflation on governmental
popularity as measured by opinion polls from the
mid-1950s to the 1970s for the U.s., Germany,
and the U.K. His estimates suggest that a 1 per-
centage point rise in the unemployment rate
together with a 4 percentage point fall in infla-tion would leave the government's popularity
unchanged in the u.s. In Germany, in contrast,
the negative impactofsuch a rise in unemploy-
ment would be offset by a drop in inflation of
just 1.3 percent. The U.K. falls at the opposite
extreme-inflation would need to decline by 8.6
percent to offset a rise in the unemployment rate
of 1 percent if the government's popularity were
to remain unchanged. Thus, one can interpret
this as evidence to rank the three countries ac-
cording to their preferences for inflation relative
to unemployment: Germany gives greatest im-
portance to low inflation, then the U.S., then the
U.K. Countries that weigh inflation heavily, like
Germany, should have low average rates of infla-
tion. This is, in' fact, exactly what the data reveal.
From 1960 to 1979, the average rates of inflation
in Germany, the U.S., and the U.K. were, respec-
tively, 3.7 percent, 4.7 percent, and 8.0 percent.
An alternative interpretation
So far, the discussion has suggested that some
countries, like New Zealand, have had more in-
flation than the U.S. because their citizens have
been willing to tolerate higher rates of inflation.
But there is an alternative interpretation. Perhaps
countries that have high inflation simply learn to
live with it. Social institutions and economic ar-
rangements may adjust so as to reduce the costs
of inflation. Indexation of wages, financial con-
tracts, and taxes, for example, can reduce the
distortionary income and wealth redistribution
that inflation can cause. Inflation may be viewed
as a less serious problem in high inflation coun-
tries simply because those countries have ad-
justed in ways that help ameliorate the
consequences of inflation.
This interpretation, however, is consistent with
the general view that a country's inflation rate
settles at a level that balances the perceived
costs of inflation with the perceived short-run
gains. Adjustments that help to eliminate or
reduce the perceived costs-such as indexation
of wages, social security payments, financial
instruments, and so forth-will result in a rise
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